p is, in a way that is tied up with what it is to know that p, justified in believing that p. This latter view is also disputable. One might reject it on the grounds that while being justified seems to implicate reflective capacities-those involved in thinking about and weighing up reasons-animals that lack such reflective capacities have knowledge. For present purposes I think we can sidestep such matters. I am concerned with human knowledge and thus with the knowledge of agents who have reflective capacities and are capable of thinking about why they believe as they do. I take it as a working assumption that when such agents know that something is so they are, at least normally, justified in believing it to be so on account of having an adequate reason to believe that it is so-a reason to which they will normally have access. I seek to make sense of the idea that, for such agents, knowledge at least normally goes along with being justified in believing.
A quick response to the challenge posed by testimony would be to say that the mere fact that a person tells us that p never is an adequate reason to believe that p. So it is right that being apprised of this fact is 'too little' to give us knowledge that p, but wrong to suppose that this poses a problem. On the contrary, following this line of thought, we can be justified in believing that p in view of other things we believe which, together with the fact that we have been told that p, provide us with adequate reason to believe that p. Non-testimonial cases provide the model. A plausible view with roots in Hume is that, for instance, we can come to know that the grass making up the lawn lacks nutrients on the basis of the fact that it is yellow. We can do so with the help of a generalization to the effect that when grass is yellow it lacks (or is very likely to lack) nutrients. Applied to testimonial cases this suggests that we need a generalization relating to the veracity of the testimonial utterances with which we are confronted. The needed generalization would be to the effect that when somebody of 3 a certain sort tells us something and various further conditions are satisfied then what they tell us will be true or very likely to be true. The reason for which we are looking would be constituted by such a generalization along with a corresponding statement to the effect that this speaker is of the relevant sort and the further conditions are satisfied.
1 An account along these lines would be reductionist in that it assimilates the epistemology of knowledge or justified belief from testimony to a general epistemology of empirical evidence. Attractive though it seems, this approach is not free of difficulties. It is not a trivial matter to specify a generalization covering the informant's utterance on which we could plausibly be taken to rely. It is not that we are powerless to pick out factors that are relevant: type of person, manner of speaking, content of utterance, the immediate context of utterance (the situation in which it is made), the wider context of the utterance incorporating any shared histories of informant and recipient, and the culture or cultures to which they belong. The problem is to work determinate forms of these factors into a generalization that could do the business on a specific occasion. 2 There are really two problems here. One is that it is far from clear that we routinely have a suitable generalization at our disposal.
The other is that it is far from clear that even if we had we would routinely be justified in accepting it when we gain knowledge from testimony. No doubt we shall have had much experience that affects the level of confidence that we have in what we have been told. But it is a further matter whether this experience will have led us even to believe a determinate generalization that will do the job, far less have furnished us with adequate evidence for accepting it.
4
This is the kind of problem I wish to explore in this discussion. In the next section I consider perceptual knowledge. In section 3 I give an indication of how one might develop an account of testimony building on a non-standard account of knowledge from indicator phenomena. An instance of the latter would be knowing that it has rained because the streets and other outside surfaces are wet. From these discussions emerges a conception of the importance of recognitional abilities which in section 4 is developed to yield an account of reasons for belief in the cases under consideration and a general view of the connection between knowledge, justified belief and reasons.
Section 5 explores what I call detached standing knowledge. I do not claim to establish my general view on these matters within the space available here, only to have made it plausible enough to merit further investigation.
Perceptual knowledge
A problem-structure analogous to that described in relation to testimony arises in cases of perceptual knowledge. Here too it can seem that we gain a lot from a little, and it is hard to see how the little can supply us with the required adequate reason. This is how things are liable to seem from a certain theoretical stance that has been widely accepted. On this stance, seeing that Bill has arrived is a matter of being in a certain psychological state-having an experience such that it looks to one as if Bill has arrived-plus the satisfaction of further conditions. The conditions are, roughly, It is one thing to feel compelled to accept this view and another to see how it can be true. We would need some account of how experiences can justify beliefs. An apparently promising account is available via a combination of two ideas: (i) that being justified in believing something is to be explained in terms of forming the belief in a competent way-specifically, in a way that manifests competence in deploying the relevant concepts; (ii) that basing beliefs on experiences of an appropriate type can be a manifestation of conceptual competence, analogous to basing a belief on 6 other things one believes. 4 Being justified in believing that p on the basis of other things one believes requires that in forming the belief that p on the basis of those other beliefs one exploits one's mastery of the various concepts involved. Obviously it matters that the other beliefs should have an appropriate standing. (What this must be is debatable.) The analogy for believing that p when seeing that p is that the experiences should be of an appropriate sort and that in forming one's belief one exploits one's mastery of concepts implicated by believing that p. This approach has the merit of yielding a way of developing a familiar way of thinking about Dretske's (1970) zebra case and cases like it. Consider a case-the good case-in which I am looking at a zebra in a zoo enclosure, and, in the absence of any countervailing reasons, correctly believe it to be a zebra, and another case-the bad case-in which, in the same setting, I am looking at a mule cleverly disguised as a zebra and, in the absence of any countervailing reasons, incorrectly believe it to be a zebra. On the familiar way of thinking that I have in mind we need to accommodate the idea that these cases are on a par with respect to the justification of the belief. This will seem to be a natural requirement if one accepts the usual understanding of Gettier cases. On that understanding it is assumed that, in cases in which what is believed is concluded from other things one believes, one can be justified even if the other things believed include a falsehood. With respect to perceptual Gettier cases it is assumed that a belief based on misleading experience can be justified. A standard example of the latter is correctly believing that someone one knows is at a certain location in the space in front of one, though one is looking at a life-size photograph obscuring the person one takes oneself to be looking at. An account of justified belief based on conceptual competence, conceived along the lines sketched, gives an explanation of the supposed 7 parity of justification in good/bad pairs: in both cases the belief is competently formed. Looking at the disguised mule I make a mistake in believing it to be a zebra but there is a sense in which it is quite reasonable that I should believe as I do. This reflects the fact that the belief is competently formed, as that is being understood.
After all, the animal I am looking at is indistinguishable from a zebra from a point from which I can normally tell that an animal is zebra from the way it looks, and I A radical response to the foregoing would be to sever the connection between being justified and possessing an adequate reason. 7 It might be argued that experiences must be justifiers and that there must be some basic a priori principle of justification such that if it perceptually seems to one just as if p, then, in the absence 5 The drill described by P. F. Strawson (1979: 43-44 ) is intended to initiate us into such an understanding. 6 The point about order of understanding is congenial to those who favour disjunctivist accounts of experience. See Child 1994: 143-46. 7 James Pryor (2000) treats experiences as justifiers but does not represent them as reasons.
9 of countervailing reasons, one is justified in believing that p. If there are such principles they are not self-explanatory and, in any case, the problems are not solved by denying that being justified implicates having reasons. There remains the very basic problem that experiences, conceived non-committally, seem to provide too little to account for the special standing in which knowledge consists. The problem might not seem evident. After all, it is routinely accepted that being justified in believing that p is compatible with its being false that p. 8 But even if that is so we still lack an explanation of how perception can settle it that something is so: Gettier-style justification settles nothing. That matters since it is natural to suppose that evidence adequate for knowledge that p should settle it that p. 9 Further, even if it is granted that false beliefs are sometimes justified, and we help ourselves to the account of justification in terms of competence sketched earlier, there remains the problem posed by the fact that our evaluations of beliefs do not routinely deal with the operative understanding of experiences. Here I shall stick with the idea that justified beliefs depends on having reasons, and that reasons are constituted by propositions, and see whether we can end up with a view that reflects our evaluative practices.
Knowledge from indicator phenomena and knowledge through being told

10
As we saw, gaining knowledge from testimony is problematic in straightforward cases in which we accept the testimony straight off on the say so of the informant, because it seems to involve gaining a lot from a little. The conclusion just reached can be reinforced by reflecting on how we identify a phenomenon as having some indicative significance. Think of something as straightforward as telling from the wetness of surfaces outdoors (streets, pavements, etc.) that it has been raining. This is a simple ability yet it requires one to discriminate between rain-indicating wetness and wetness that has different causes, like people washing their cars, street cleaning vehicles, hydrants spraying water, and so forth.
Learning to do this is a matter of learning to recognize rain-indicating wetness. The kind of procedure here is not in any fundamental way different from the procedure in perceptual cases, like learning to recognize goldfinches or thermometers by sight. It is a matter of being attuned to just the right kinds of visual appearance. It is not a matter of acquiring a list of features that collectively are distinctive, learning to judge when they are present, and on particular occasions basing a judgement that the thing in question is a goldfinch, or whatever. Indeed, one might have the recognitional ability yet lack the conceptual resources to form judgements to the effect that such-and-such a feature is present. Of course, in judging something by sight to be of some kind one is responding to its features, but the response is a recognitional response to the distinctive Gestalt that the features make up, not an inferential response to considerations pertaining to the features. The same applies to indicator cases. One learns that the right kind of wetness indicates that it has rained. The ability thus community would not understand the generalization in question as being true with respect to dwellings in general rather than simply to the dwellings in area with which they are familiar.
14 acquired deserves to be regarded as recognitional. It is a matter of being able to recognize that occurrences of an observed phenomenon-wetness of the right kindhave a certain significance: they indicate that it has rained. The work of learning is towards making the right kind of discriminations. It would not be false that one has this ability if there happened to be some place where, because of the peculiar waterspraying practices of the inhabitants, you could not tell that it has rained recently from the wetness of the surfaces in view. If there were such a place it could be false that when (or even most times when) there is the wetness that we associate with rain it has
rained. Yet this would be compatible with our being able, around here, to tell that it has rained by exercising the ability.
It is of some interest to note in passing that the abilities of which I am speaking amount to a kind of competence in the deployment of concepts. But competence so understood is very different from that discussed in section 2 in connection with the supposed parity of justification in pairs of good and bad cases. It is built into perceptual-recognitional abilities that they are abilities with respect to favourable environments and that their exercise is the acquisition of knowledge. In a suitably strange environment I might not be able to recognize something to be a zebra from the way it looks, because too easily could something look that way and not be a zebra.
The nature of the environment is crucial for whether one has the ability to recognize things in that environment to be of some kind. 
16
The role of recognition is of first importance in connection with an overarching theme of this essay, which concerns the problem posed by kinds of knowledge with respect to which it seems puzzling that we gain so much from what apparently is so little. It contributes towards appreciating that in the problem cases we have more to go on that might initially appear. More specifically, (a) in virtue of our recognitional abilities we can take in facts that are rich in the sense that they concern not just superficial features of objects or situations, and (b) in exercising recognitional abilities whereby we take in rich facts we are responsive to phenomena that have a high degree of informational richness. A good example of both of these points is the recognition of people. We can recognize some people as named individuals. I can see that it's Bill, a person I know, entering the room, not just something with certain superficial features. In doing so I am responsive to a host of features that make up the visual appearance of Bill entering. While I tell that it's Bill from his visual appearance I could not give a specific description of everything that goes to make up that appearance. In this kind of case we respond to a Gestalt that is informationally rich, being the resultant of determinate forms of a number of dimensions of variation. The lesson to draw, as much from indicator cases as from perceptual cases like that just described, is that after all we have a lot to go on. The real puzzle is not that we gain a lot from a little, since there is a great deal to which we respond when we gain knowledge of the kinds under discussion. The problem is to make sense of how the many features to which we respond, can impinge on our thinking. It is in connection with this that it matters that we acknowledge the role of recognition and recognitional abilities. We court failure if we try to do justice to the relevance of the features by supposing that we register their presence at the level of judgement and then apply a suitable covering generalization. The problem for that view is not just whether routinely we have evidence for the required generalization, nor even that some of the generalizations in play in the cases in question might be false (as suggested by analogues of fake barn cases). It is that in practice we need not take in the relevant features at the level of judgement. To recognize people, animals, birds, plants, or, for that matter, smoke, skid marks, deer tracks, and so forth you need to 'get your eye in'.
Analogous considerations apply to the epistemology of testimony. For gaining knowledge from testimony in straightforward cases it matters that the informant is trustworthy with respect to the thing told and that the recipient of the testimony has identified the informant as one who may be trusted on that matter. The reductionist approach can be viewed as aiming to explain how recipients identify trustworthiness in terms of features of the occasion of utterance that make it such that utterances with those features are always, or highly likely to be, true. That a host of such features is relevant to the case is not in dispute. If we reject the reductionist approach then we need to account for how they bear on our thinking and make sense of how the recipient can end up with knowledge. On the approach that I commend, instead of supposing that we register the features at the level of judgement, we should think rather in terms of our having acquired a certain sensibility that enables us to pick out acts of telling that may be relied upon. 16 I envisage this sensibility as being shaped by our experience of individual people and of the workings of the human world and our physical environment. The shaping is to be conceived as a matter of honing our discriminative capacities rather than as supplying us with information on the basis of which we accept generalizations that we then apply to particular cases. It is not that acquiring new information is irrelevant. Suppose that I have learned visually to identify roses from examples, or illustrations of examples of garden-variety roses.
When walking by a hedgerow along a country road I fail to recognize a rambling rose as a rose. When it is pointed out to me that this rambling plant is a rose, though its flowers seem so unlike the full blooms of garden roses, I acquire new information about how roses can look. My ability to tell by sight when a flower is a rose is refined so that I avoid false denials that I would have made previously and become generally more circumspect about denying that something is a rose when it is unlike the flowers I originally learned to call roses. It might well be that all this is accompanied by some circumstances people come over to us as telling the truth or as not telling the truth or leave us in doubt or indifferent as to whether they are telling the truth. As I remarked previously, we are not at a loss to point to some of the variable factors that influence our response. It is implausible to suppose that we latch on to determinate forms of these at the level of judgement, but entirely realistic to suppose that discriminative capacities come into play, capacities that not only explain our responses to what we are told but which can amount to abilities to tell that the informant is telling the truth.
If the Departmental secretary phones me at home to tell me that a student urgently wishes to see me, I thereby know that there is a student who urgently wishes to see me. That requires both that the secretary should be highly reliable on such matters and that I am attuned to this and to the character of her communication. My point has been that this attunement is better seen as involving a sensibility acquired through experience than explained in terms of the reductionist model of reasoning from matters of fact.
I have only gestured towards an account that accords a central role to sensibility in the epistemology of testimony. A fuller account should, I believe, accord an equally central role to the idea that there is a social practice surrounding the speech act of telling. I mean by this that telling is a move in a cluster of essentially rule-governed activities into which we are socially initiated. The practice accounts for the ease with which we can identify utterances as acts of telling whereby speakers give others to understand that they are informing and thus speaking from knowledge. 17 It also accounts for widely shared understanding that telling is supposed to impart knowledge. I do not, however, think that an adequate account of the epistemology testimony drops out of the theory of the speech act of telling any more than an account of what justifies us in trusting promises made to us falls out of the theory of the speech act of promising. In both cases the rules of the practice can be readily flouted. We need in addition an account of the powers of discrimination whereby we can, sometimes, trust the informant or the person making the promise. First, we need to note that I recognize my neighbour because I have a specific recognitional ability that serves this purpose-in suitable conditions I am able to tell by looking at a person whether or not he or she is my neighbour. On this occasion I have exercised this ability and have thereby come to know that my neighbour is in her garden. There is no doubt that the natural way to spell out my reason for taking my neighbour to be there is in terms of the fact that I see that she is there. So next we need to explain how that reason is available to me-how I know that I see that she is there. This is not so very difficult. For my knowledge here is also recognitional, arising as it does in direct response to my current visual experience, via the exercise of a certain recognitional ability, specifically, an ability to tell by looking at an F/something G/X that I see it to be an F/something G/X. In the case in hand, I
recognize my neighbour to be someone I see to be my neighbour in her garden. That amounts to knowing that I see that she is in her garden. It would be at least misleading to say that I introspect my experience for my attention is directed outwards towards 22 my neighbour. Just as I exercise a recognitional ability when I apply the concept of my neighbour being in her garden to my neighbour, in direct response to the visual experiences I have as I look over at her in the garden, so I exercise a distinct recognitional ability when I apply the concept seeing my neighbour to be in her garden to me and my neighbour,respectively, in direct response to the very same experiences. By exercising these abilities I know both that my neighbour is in her garden and that I see that she is. The fact made available to me by knowing that I see that she is there serves as a reason to believe that she is, and for some time thereafter serves as a reason to believe that she was then in her garden.
A significant feature of this account is that we explain how I know that my neighbour is in her garden without adverting to the reason for me to believe that she is that is constituted by the fact that I see that she is there. Rather than account for the that enables us both to know that something is so through perceiving that it is so and to have access to a reason to believe that it is so.
In indicator cases the natural explanation of how we come to know is that we have discerned, often directly through perception, that the indicator phenomenon has occurred, and are able to recognize the significance of the occurrence of that phenomenon. Recognizing the significance of the wetness of surfaces outside just is seeing that this wetness indicates, and thus provides a clinching reason to think, that it has been raining. It is against this background that I wish to account for the acquisition of knowledge through testimony. We need, I think, to turn our attention away from covering generalizations and towards the sensibilities that enable us to discriminate truthful acts of telling. These sensibilities are applied not simply to discriminate between people, but to pick out from among a person's utterances those that are to be believed on the say so of that person. People who are knowledgeable on some topics are not on others. Those who are sincere on some topics can be insincere on others. It is only through experience that we become attuned to picking out what is to be believed. However, the role of experience is not best conceived as that of supplying evidence on the basis of which we hold people trustworthy on this or that topic. Its role is that of inculcating and shaping a sensibility.
Detached standing knowledge
There is a type of knowledge that has not been extensively discussed though much of our knowledge is of this type. It is knowledge of factual matters that we have picked up and retained though we have lost touch with the relevant sources of information. I call it detached standing knowledge. This is of interest both because it poses further problems about reasons for belief and because reflection on this type of knowledge will serve to reinforce the claim that the epistemological role of experience is not confined to that of supplying evidence on which we base our beliefs. I suspect that the reason why detached standing knowledge has not received much discussion is that it is assumed that it is straightforwardly based on evidence. The matter is more complicated than this suggests. having retained the knowledge rather than just a willingness to avow that I know.
We can, I think, make sense of the idea that we routinely have knowledge based on evidence in a stronger sense. I might know that deer were in the vicinity yesterday because I recall seeing fresh deer tracks. In that case the manner in which I now know that there were deer around yesterday is tied to recollection of the evidence provided by the tracks. It is based on the evidence recalled, not just in that my having seen the tracks caused me to know in the first place but in the sense that the recalled evidence plays a role in both sustaining my knowledge and explaining why I now know. My current knowledge that kangaroos are marsupials is not like that: it is not evidencebased in that strong sense. Even if it is evidence-based in the weaker sense, we still need an explanation of why it maintains its status as knowledge. I want to sketch a picture of detached standing knowledge that makes abilities central once again.
The key idea is that detached standing knowledge is, roughly speaking, an ability to recall a fact. that are necessary for the acquisition of knowledge on the say so of another. On the model I suggest, we acquire the ability to recollect a fact through encounters-usually repeated encounters-with reliable sources of information. The role of experience is that of honing the ability rather than furnishing us with evidence-based knowledge in the sense explained above-the strong sense that requires that recollection of the evidence plays a role in sustaining the knowledge. It is important not to take the view to imply that any disposition to acknowledge that it is a fact that such-and-such counts as knowledge of that fact. It matters that the facts recalled are available, and became available to us, though reliable sources.
A strength of the proposed account is that it accommodates the possibility that much of our standing knowledge derives from having soaked up information before we had the discriminatory capacities for weighing up testimony and other sources of information, which is to say, before we were in a position to acquire evidenced-based knowledge. Indeed, since this seems to be a very live possibility, a weakness of the view that all standing knowledge is evidence-based is that it can account for early learning only by finessing on what it takes to have evidence-based knowledge. There is no need to go in for such finessing if we acknowledge that experience can have an ability-inculcating role that is distinct from its role in providing us with evidence.
Adopting this view, can we respect the idea that, even with respect to detached standing knowledge, reflective agents routinely know how they know? The first point to note is that we can discriminate between, on the one hand, what we know, clearly recalling it to be so, and, on the other hand, what we think might well be so but do not know. If we are sufficiently discriminating in these matters, our confidence that we recall some fact can be an indicator that what is recalled is a fact-an indicator from which we tell that it is a fact. These discriminatory capacities are possessed and exercised in the context of an understanding of the workings and practices of the human world and of our own experience of sources of information. If we do not know specifically how we came to know the facts in question, we know about the kind of sources from which we gleaned our information and we know that we make use of these sources. The upshot is that we can rightly be confident that we remember some fact if we have exercised a capacity for discriminating between what we do and do not remember. Such a capacity will be informed by an understanding of the general ways in which the information would have been acquired. In these cases we do not know specifically how we came to know, but there is a sense in which we still know how we now know. We know in that we remember. 
